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Abstract— It is difficult to implement an efficient detection approach for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and many factors 
contribute to this challenge. One such challenge concerns establishing adequate boundaries and finding a proper data source. Typical 
IDS detection approaches deal with raw traffics. These traffics need to be studied in depth and thoroughly investigated in order to 
extract the required knowledge base. Another challenge involves implementing the binary decision. This is because there are no 
reasonable limits between normal and attack traffics patterns. In this paper, we introduce a novel idea capable of supporting the 
proper data source while avoiding the issues associated with the binary decision. This paper aims to introduce a detection approach 
for defining abnormality by using the Fuzzy Rule Interpolation (FRI) with Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 
Management Information Base (MIB) parameters. The strength of the proposed detection approach is based on adapting the SNMP-
MIB parameters with the FRI.  This proposed method eliminates the raw traffic processing component which is time consuming and 
requires extensive computational measures. It also eliminates the need for a complete fuzzy rule based intrusion definition. The 
proposed approach was tested and evaluated using an open source SNMP-MIB dataset and obtained a 93% detection rate. 
Additionally, when compared to other literature in which the same test-bed environment was employed along with the same number 
of parameters, the proposed detection approach outperformed the support vector machine and neural network. Therefore, combining 
the SNMP-MIB parameters with the FRI based reasoning could be beneficial for detecting intrusions, even in the case if the fuzzy 
rule based intrusion definition is incomplete (not fully defined). 
Keywords— Intrusion Detection System; Fuzzy Rule Interpolation; Simple Network Management Protocol; Management Information 
Base.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, computers and network resources face different 
type of attacks. Modern attacks are implemented ingeniously, 
i.e. intruders are keeping themselves up to date with recent 
detection mechanisms to avoid detection. One efficient 
solution is the IDS detection mechanism. The IDS is currently 
one of the primary components used for protecting computers 
and networks against attacks. However, implementing an 
efficient IDS detection mechanism is not a straightforward 
task. IDS uses data sources to detect the different types of 
attacks. Therefore, the IDS detection mechanism requires a 
proper data source to be able to analyze the inbound and 
outbound traffics and use them to detect any abnormalities. 
 
The typical IDS detection mechanism uses the raw network 
traffic as a data source to detect abnormalities within the 
network. Dealing with raw traffics requires in depth analysis 
and review to extract the information relevant for helping the 
attack detection [1]. The SNMP-MIB parameters can also 
offer the required information, yet reducing the extensive 
processing time necessary for analyzing the raw traffics. The 
SNMP-MIB can be considered as a rich data collection 
fetched from a series of devices for producing realistic 
information about the health of a network, which can be also 
beneficial for detecting attacks. Moreover, the binary decision 
related to the attack events poses another challenge for 
implementing an efficient IDS detection mechanism, because 
there is no clear decision line between normal and abnormal 
traffic patterns [2]. The fuzzy system provides an effective 
solution for dealing with the issues associated with 
establishing normal and abnormal decision boundaries. The 
fuzzy system has the ability to offer results in an explicit 
scheme and, consequentially, to determine the level of the 
attack. When as a binary decision, the degree of attack level 
generates an alarm, the provided attack level can help the 
administrator better understand the current network security 
status. On the other hand applying classical fuzzy reasoning 
methods i.e. Mamdani [3] and Takagi-Sugeno [4], the fuzzy 
rule base representing the attack level needs to be complete. 
Thus the rule base size grows exponentially with the number 
of the observed network parameters. In the case of partially 
defined incomplete fuzzy rule bases, the classical fuzzy 
reasoning methods could not offer the expected results for all 
the possible network parameter observations [5], [6]. 
 
In application areas such as IDS, it is challenging to 
generate complete fuzzy rule base capable of handling all 
possible expected observations. As a result, it is imperative to 
implement a fuzzy concept, especially for the IDS application 
area, that benefits from extending the binary decision to the 
continuous space and at the same time can efficiently handle 
the situation of the incompletely defined fuzzy rule base. 
Hereby, this paper proposes a novel IDS concept which 
implements the fuzzy rule interpolation as a detection 
mechanism based on the SNMP-MIB parameters. The 
strength of FRI methods comes from the combination of the 
fuzzy concept and the interpolation techniques. The FRI 
methods offer the required conclusion (the approximated level 
of attack) even when the fuzzy rules describing the attack 
situations are not completely defined. Consequently, the fuzzy 
rule base construction can be dramatically simplified. The FRI 
based IDS methods can achieve a satisfactory detection rate 
even using only a relatively small number of fuzzy rules. In 
this paper, we break down the implementation of the proposed 
FRI IDS detection approach into three main steps: 
 
 
▪ To identify how the SNMP-MIB parameters can be 
used as a useful data source for detecting 
abnormality. 
▪ To implement the proposed detection approach based 
on the strength of the fuzzy rule interpolation and the 
SNMP-MIB parameters. 
▪ To highlight and discuss the difference between the 
proposed detection approach and other approaches 
that detect intrusions based on SNMP-MIB 
parameters. 
 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section (II) 
illustrates recent works related to the application of intrusion 
detection based on SNMP-MIB parameters. Section (III), 
investigates and analyzes the SNMP-MIB dataset which is 
illustrated in detail. Then, section (IV) introduces the fuzzy 
rule interpolation. Section (V) introduces the proposed 
detection approach in detail followed by the simulation and 
results in section (VI). Lastly, section (VII) concludes the 
paper. 
II. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM BASED ON 
SNMP-MIB 
This section presents some relevant works related to the 
application of the detection mechanism for intrusion detection. 
It also provides a brief overview of different methods and 
approaches that are used for intrusion detection using the 
SNMP-MIB parameters. Typically, the SNMP is used to 
collect information from different data sources such as 
switches, routers, etc. This information is used to manage and 
troubleshot different network devices. The typical IDS 
detection mechanism uses the raw traffic to assess the threats 
within connected devices. Raw traffic requires extensive 
investigative pre-processing to extract the required 
information. This investigative pre-processing is a time-
consuming task for the IDS detection mechanism [1]. 
Therefore, the SNMP-MIB parameters offer a solution that 
provides the required wealth of information without needing 
to extensively investigate and pre-process a large amount of 
raw traffic.  
 
The work of Cabrera et al. presented in [7] is one of the 
first attempts to apply the SNMP-MIB parameters as the data 
source for the IDS detection mechanism. The authors 
proposed a detection mechanism for Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS). Three types (Targa3, UDP Flood ad Ping 
Flood) of attacks were detected using the proposed detection 
mechanism. Altogether 90 SNMP-MIB parameters were used 
to detect the previous types of DDOS attacks. The SNMP-
MIB parameters were collected from the simulated test-bed 
environment. The proposed detection mechanism was able to 
successfully detect the predefined DDOS attacks. 
 
In [1], Yu et al. propose a lightweight IDS detection 
mechanism by adapting the machine learning algorithm to the 
SNMP-MIB parameters. The proposed detection mechanism 
avoided the raw traffic analyzation and used the statistical 
MIB parameters to recognize the degree of abnormality within 
connected devices. The authors applied the features selection 
algorithm to decrease a large number of SNMP-MIB 
parameters. The relevant parameters were determined using 
the correlation feature selection algorithm and the network 
traffic was classified using the support vector machine. 
Furthermore, the SNMP-MIB parameters were extracted from 
real-time experiments. The proposed approach achieved a fast 
detection time and a high rate of accuracy. The work of Yu et 
al. in [8] focuses on using SNMP-MIB parameters to detect 
flooding attacks. The authors designed the flooding attack 
detection mechanism by adapting the C4.5 algorithm. The 
SNMP-MIB parameters were collected from the simulation 
environment operating the flooding attack. Then, the C4.5 
algorithm starts detecting and classifying the traffics based on 
the recorded SNMP-MIB parameters. The proposed approach 
was able to obtain a 93.0% detection rate. 
 
In [9], Hsiao et al. proposed a detection mechanism for an 
ARP spoofing attack. The SNMP-MIB parameters were used 
instead of the raw traffic. The proposed detection approach 
was contracted into three parts. The first part was adapted to 
the Naive Bayesian algorithm. The second part applied the 
support vector machine and last part applied the C4.5 
algorithm. The authors recorded their findings and highlighted 
both the weak and strong points for each of these parts that 
were used for detecting the ARP spoofing attack based on 
SNMP-MIB parameters. Typical performance metrics such as 
accuracy rate, false positive rate and missing rate were 
recorded for the implemented algorithms. The implemented 
experiments demonstrated that the C4.5 achieved the highest 
accuracy rate. The lowest value of false alarms was recorded 
by the support vector machine algorithm. The Naive Bayesian 
algorithm had the lowest accuracy rate within the 
implemented experiments. 
 
 
From another perspective, the decentralized detection 
mechanism based on the clustering algorithm and SNMP-MIB 
parameters was proposed by Cerroni et al. in [10]. The 
proposed decentralized mechanisms were divided into the 
monitoring phase and the traffic detection phase. In the 
monitoring phase, the SNMP-MIB parameters were gathered 
from several agents. These parameters were forwarded to the 
distributed data mining algorithms for the sake of classifying 
the observation as either normal or abnormal. The proposed 
decentralized detection mechanism was tested and evaluated 
using the SNMP-MIB dataset and was able to detect the 
plausible intrusions within the dataset that related to the 
decentralized detection mechanisms. 
 
In [11], Cerroni et al. introduced a new distributed data 
mining method in order to detect the intrusion based on 
SNMP-MIB parameters. The proposed method has been tested 
for decentralized testbed environments. The SNMP-MIB 
parameters were collected from the simulated network 
environment. Fourteen SNMP-MIB parameters were used to 
detect the specific type of DDOS attack. These parameters 
related to the IP and TCP groups. The experiments conducted 
reflect that the proposed mechanism obtained an acceptable 
detection rate. 
 
Some other works were used in a hybrid approach,in 
conjunction with the SNMP-MIB parameters, to detect for 
abnormalities within the network traffic. In [12], Namvarasl 
and Ahmadzadeh proposed a hybrid approach to detect DDOS 
based on SNMP-MIB parameters. The proposed approach 
consisted of three modules; the first module was constructed 
for the features selection of the SNMP-MIB parameters. In the 
second module, the detection mechanism was generated based 
on high ranked SNMP-MIB parameters and the C4.5 and 
RIPPER were implemented to detect the intrusions. The 
proposed approach was tested and evaluated based on the 
SNMP-MIB dataset. The imported dataset consisted of 66 
SNMP-MIB parameters. It also had the following type of 
attacks: UDP flood attack, ICMP flood attack and TCP-SYN 
flood attack. The proposed approach was able to detect 
different types of attacks within the imported SNMP-MIB 
dataset. 
 
 
The previous works provided plausible contributions and, 
at the same time, supported the idea that the SNMP-MIB 
parameters are instrumental in detecting and recognizing the 
intrusion. Using SNMP-MIB parameters avoids the need for 
the time-consuming analysis of massive amounts of raw 
traffics. Previous works also shared common issues such as 
the difficulties associated with the detection mechanisms 
which suffered from a lack of clear boundaries for 
distinguishing between normal and abnormal traffic. 
Furthermore, the previous detection mechanisms did not 
determine the level of degree of abnormality; they only 
applied a binary decision to recognize the normal and 
abnormal traffic. In response to these issues, this paper aims to 
introduce a novel approach for detecting and preventing 
abnormalities by implementing the FRI approach with the 
SNMP-MIB parameters. The FRI approaches are 
implemented primarily to avoid binary decisions, and instead, 
establishing a gradient scale for distinguishing the normal and 
abnormal traffics. Additionally, they generate results 
(Detection Decision) in a clear and understandable form. 
Contrary to the classical fuzzy systems, the FRI approaches do 
not require a large amount of fuzzy rules (i.e. expert 
knowledge this case) for determining the level, or degree of 
abnormality within the protected network. Finally, the FRI 
approaches can produce results, even in an incompletely 
defined knowledge representation (fuzzy rule base). 
 
III. SNMP-MIB DATASET 
A network attack [13] is any process used to perform 
malicious actions against any host inside a network with the 
intention of compromising the security of that network.  In 
[14], [15], [16], a Mobile Agent (MA) was used to read the 
SNMP-MIB data from the local nodes that use the MIBs to 
store that traffic data locally. The MA was used  to overcome 
the limitations of the centralized management system, or the 
IDSs. The above-mentioned works reflected that the statistical 
methods, based on Wiener filter and MA technology, could be 
joined to detect network intrusions. The suggested model 
intended to detect all the attacks. The MIB variables were 
chosen from the IF and IP groups, and the studied scenarios 
were the decoy port-scan, the buffer overflow, the brute force 
attack and the null session attack. 
 
In this paper, the dataset we used was the same as it was 
introduced in [17]. This dataset was originally generated to 
target DoS attacks. A DoS attack is blocking legitimate user 
requests for services the server can provide. Such attacks can 
be carried out by flooding the chosen server with a high 
volume of traffic, thereby consuming all of the server’s 
resources and, consequentially, preventing the server from 
responding to genuine requests. These attacks can be 
generated either from a local or remote node in a different 
network. DoS attacks are usually difficult to assess and 
prevent [18], making them one of the most challenging type 
threats. An even more severe threat is the DDoS attack, which 
is a type of flooding attack that is generated from various 
nodes simultaneously [19]. 
 
In this work, seven classic DoS flooding attacks are 
studied. The first one is the TCP-SYN attack. This attack 
abuses the susceptibility of the three-way handshake 
mechanism (SYN, SYN-ACK and ACK) operating between 
the host and the server when establishing the TCP/IP protocol 
connection. During the process, the attacker sends a SYN 
control packet. The server on the other side responds to the 
SYN request by sending an SYN-ACK packet. Meanwhile, 
the server stores and reserves all the resources and waits for 
an ACK from the sender. While the server is waiting for the 
ACK packet, the request remains in the memory stack. The 
server will not receive ACK packets from the attacker, and the 
attacker will send more SYN requests within a short amount 
time to exhaust the server’s resources until it is unable to 
respond to any new requests [20]. 
 
The second attack is the UDP flood attack. This type of 
attack sends UDP packets to random ports on the victim 
server. When the server deals with these packets and discovers 
that the packets are empty, the server will then send back an 
error message through ICMP protocol to the sender. The 
server’s resources, such as bandwidth which is very important 
for the performance of the network will be exhausted by the 
volume of useless or empty packets, and therefore will not be 
able to respond to any other requests. The UDP flood attack is 
typically very effective in smaller networks [21]. 
 
 
The third attack is the ICMP-ECHO attack. This type of 
attack floods the victim’s bandwidth thus preventing new 
connections from being initiated. The PING command is used 
to test whether, or not the host is alive on the network. When a 
device receives a PING request, it will automatically reply 
with a message informing the sender of its status. This type of 
attack tricks the system by crafting a large number of ICMP 
packets using a spoof source IP address as the victim’s IP 
address in order to reply directly to it later. Then it sends these 
packets through a network broadcast address which directs 
numerous hosts to send their replies to the same victim’s IP 
address at the same time. Eventually, the high volume of reply 
messages will overwhelm the system and exhaust the victim’s 
resources [17]. 
 
The fourth attack is the HTTP flood attack. This attack 
targets a web server and consumes the victim’s resources, 
such as memory, CPU, bandwidth, etc. The attacker sends a 
huge number of valid HTTP requests (GET or POST) to a 
web server. Typically, these requests are generated by hosts 
called botnets. Each one of the bots sends a large number of 
legal requests at once. If there is a large number of botnets, the 
request rate will be higher than that is usually generated by 
typical users. This attack may be one of the most dangerous 
threats because it is hard to differentiate between normal and 
abnormal HTTP traffic [22].  The fifth attack is the Slowloris 
attack, whereby the attacker sends sessions with a high load of 
requests by opening multiple connections to the victim server 
and trying to keep these connections open as long as possible. 
In this case, the requests are partial HTTP requests. The attack 
lasts until all available sockets are reserved by the HTTP 
requests, causing the server to freeze in response to any 
legitimate connection [24]. The final attack is the Slowpost 
attack. Similar to the previous attack, the attacker hereby 
sends a complete, rather than a partial, HTTP header request, 
including the content length field in the post message body. 
The data fills the message body at the rate of one byte every 
two minutes. At the same time, the server remains waiting for 
each message body to be completed, leading to a denial of 
services [17]. 
 
 
SNMP-MIB data are rich sources providing clear statistical 
information about the current network device status. The 
SNMP-MIB is a widely deployed protocol in most network 
devices, and available without any additional new hardware, 
or software investment. By reading the MIB data, some of the 
major challenges of the intrusion detection can be avoided. 
The dataset we used contains 4998 connection records. The 
data is distributed into eight main classes as described in 
Table I. 
TABLE I 
TRAFFIC TYPE AND NUMBER OF GENERATED RECORDS 
 
No. Type of Traffic Number of Records 
1 Normal 600 
2 TCP-SYN 960 
3 UDP flood 773 
4 ICMP-ECHO 632 
5 HTTP flood 573 
6 Slowloris 780 
7 Slowpost 480 
8 Brute Force 200 
TOTAL 4998 
 
 
This MIB dataset has been collected from a router. The 
dataset has 34 MIB variables from 5 MIB groups in MIB-II. 
The groups are IF, IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP. The groups and 
their variables are listed in Table II (see appendix). 
IV. FUZZY RULE INTERPOLATION (FRI) 
The term "fuzzy logic" was introduced initially by 
Professor Lotfi Zadeh [23]. Fuzzy logic could be a suitable 
reasoning method for different application areas. The rapid 
growth of intrusion techniques poses a challenge for binary-
decision based detection approaches. The crisp set [24] is not 
suitable for expressing the level of attack, which could 
improve the expression capabilities of the modern intrusion 
techniques. The fuzzy system also provide the required 
boundary smoothing because it can also deal with 
approximation, not only with precise values. The fuzzy system 
presents the conclusion (output) in a clear and comprehensive 
scheme. Establishing a fuzzy system requires several 
prerequisites: 
 
▪ Defining the universes of the expected observations 
(inputs) and the possible output of the fuzzy system. 
▪ Defining the fuzzy partitions for the inputs and 
outputs of the fuzzy system. 
▪ Generating the required fuzzy rules. 
 
Typically, IDS detection mechanism recognizes the 
intrusion based on crisp set that grants only membership of 0, 
or 1. In the classical fuzzy system, the fuzzifier transforms the 
crisp input parameters (observations) into fuzzy sets. The 
output of the fuzzy system is calculated based on the fuzzified 
observations [2]. The classical reasoning methods, i.e. 
Mamdani and Takagi-Sugeno, demands a complete fuzzy rule 
base to generate the desired output. Therefore, the classical 
reasoning methods could not infer the conclusion for any 
observation that is not defined in the fuzzy rule base [25]. 
 
Fig.1 shows an example of the complete fuzzy rule base in 
a classical fuzzy system. The parameter X is considered to be 
the input observation which is covered by the fuzzy rule base. 
Conversely, Fig.2 presents a case when an observation X is 
exists, but not covered by any rules of the fuzzy rule base. 
 
 
 
Fig.1  Complete Fuzzy Rule Base 

 
 
Fig.2  Incomplete Fuzzy Rule Base 

In the second case (Fig.2), the classical reasoning method 
could not offer any conclusion; it is a method that is not 
always capable of satisfying the needs of some application 
areas (requiring conclusion for all the possible observations). 
In some application areas, where there is a large number of 
unexpected observations and the expert knowledge base 
cannot cover all the observation domain, it could be difficult 
to present the complete fuzzy rule base [2]. Therefore, the FRI 
methods were introduced to overcome the demand of the 
complete fuzzy rule base. They generate the possible 
inference even in cases where there is no complete fuzzy rule 
base. Furthermore, the FRI methods reduce the number of 
fuzzy rules which could be beneficial for both decreasing the 
complexity of the fuzzy system, and the computation time of 
large systems. 
 
The proposed IDS approach is adapting the Fuzzy 
Interpolation based on the Vague Environment (FIVE) 
method as an inference engine. The FIVE method was 
introduced by Kovacs in [26], [27] and [35]. The concept of 
the vague environment, introduced by Klawon in [28], refers 
to the indistinguishability of a fuzzy set and a crisp value. The 
concept of the vague environment can be expressed by a 
scaling function (s). The proper scaling function (s) which 
describes all the fuzzy sets of a fuzzy partition, should be 
implemented to produce a vague environment. According to 
[26], [27], [28] the scaling function (s) is suitable for 
describing the shapes of all fuzzy set of a fuzzy partition. In 
the vague environment, the level of similarity between two 
fuzzy sets illustrates the fuzzy membership function M(x). In 
the vague environment, two values are ε-distinguishable if 
their distance is greater than ε: 
 
 
Likewise, δs(X1,X2) represents the vague distance for the 
values X1 and X2.  
V. THE PROPOSED DETECTION APPROACH 
This section introduces the full architecture of the proposed 
detection approach in detail according to its main functions 
and prerequisites. The proposed detection approach adapts the 
FIVE FRI method as the inference engine. The FIVE method 
offers an approximated conclusion even in an incomplete 
fuzzy rule base.   
 
 The general structure of the proposed detection approach, 
as it is shown in Fig.3, is initiated by the data-cleaning stage. 
This stage is responsible for assembling the required 
information using the SNMP agents. This information is then 
forwarded to the SNMP manager which consists of a 
repository of MIB parameters. During the data cleaning stage, 
the MIB parameters were evaluated to determine their relevant 
parameters. The cleaning stage aims to reduce a large number 
of MIB parameters by eliminating those that are irrelevant. 
The detection stage of the proposed detection approach started 
with the Sparse Fuzzy Model Identification (SFMI), 
introduced by Johanyak in  [29]. The outputs obtained from 
the data cleaning stage were passed through SFMI. It is worth 
mentioning that there are several operations achieved by the 
detection stage, including the sparse fuzzy rule generation, 
fuzzification and the inference engine technique.   
 
 
Fig.3  The General Structure of The Proposed Detection Approach 
 
 The Data Cleaning Stage 
The MIB parameters are characterized by the wealth of 
beneficial information they can offer for defining abnormality 
and reflect the normal and abnormal nature of the network 
traffics. The MIB dataset applied as an example in the rest of 
this paper is introduced by Al-Kasassbeh et al. in [17]. The 
data cleaning stage is essential for implementing the proposed 
detection approach. During the cleaning stage, the imported 
MIB dataset was divided into two parts. The first part was 
used for optimization, and detection approach generation, 
meanwhile the second part was used for the validation 
process. Sixty percent of the imported MIB dataset was 
randomly selected to train the proposed detection approach, 
and the rest of MIB dataset was used for the validation 
process. 
 
 
The imported MIB dataset consists of a large number of 
MIB parameters. To simplify the process, the top five relevant 
MIB parameters [30], [17] were chosen as input parameters 
for detecting the abnormality in the proposed detection 
approach. These MIB parameters are the IP-Out-Discards and 
IP-In-Discards from the IP MIB group. IF-In-Discards and IF-
Out-Discards from the interface MIB group and ICMP-Out-
Dest-Unreachs from the ICMP MIB group.  The training part 
is designed to generate two repositories. The first repository 
consists of only the intrusion traffics, and the second 
repository includes only the normal traffics.  Algorithm 1 
summarizes the data cleaning.   
 
Algorithm 1: Data Cleaning Stage 
Input: The MIB dataset 
Output: Two repositories of normal and abnormal  
1: while : the number of records not obtained do 
2: Re-sample the MIB- dataset into normal and 
abnormal 
3: Extract the top Five MIB parameters 
(ipOutDiscards, icmpOutDestUnreachs, 
ipInDiscardsfor, ifInDiscards and ifoutDiscards). 
 
4: Eliminate the rest of MIB parameters. 
5: Forward the normal traffic beside the relevant 
parameters to the normal repository. 
6: Forward the abnormal traffic besides the relevant 
parameters to the abnormal repository 
7: end while 
 
 
Consequently, 2970 instances of normal and abnormal 
traffics were stored in two repositories. These instances had 
only the top five relevant MIB parameters. 
 
 

 The Detection Stage 
The detection stage consists of several operations including 
fuzzification, sparse fuzzy rule generation and adapting the 
inference engine. The proposed detection approach was 
designed and constructed using the SFMI [29]. Before 
constructing the proposed detection approach, the top-five 
relevant MIB parameters were forwarded to the SFMI.  
 
 As mentioned in section (IV), the fuzzy rule generation 
and fuzzy sets optimization are the necessary modelling steps 
for constructing the proposed detection approach. In this 
work, the fuzzy rule generation and the fuzzy sets 
optimization were adapted using the Rule Base Extension 
based on the Default Set Shapes (RBE-DSS) method 
introduced by Johanyak et al. in [31] and [32]. Algorithm 2 
illustrates the sparse fuzzy rule generation process using the 
RBE-DSS method. 
 
Algorithm 2: Fuzzy Rule Generation Using RBE-DSS 
Input: The training part of MIB-parameters 
Output: The pool of sparse fuzzy rules    
1: while : The number of iterations not obtained do 
2: Initiates two fuzzy rules which covered the output 
universe. 
3: Starts modifying the initial parameters of the fuzzy 
set.  
4: The performance parameter; Root Mean Squared 
Error (RMSE) of the fuzzy system computed with 
the modified fuzzy set parameters. 
5: The fuzzy system should have the best value of 
RMSE for the next iteration. 
6: IF the RMSE parameter has the same value for           
several iterations or the performance of the fuzzy 
system interrupted Then 
7: The new fuzzy rule is generated to offer more 
chances of tuning. 
EndIF 
 
8:       The new fuzzy rule takes a position where the 
difference between the expected conclusion and 
the approximated conclusion is the maximum. 
9:    End While 
 
 
The output from Algorithm 2 is a pool of fuzzy rules 
forming a sparse fuzzy rule base. Therefore, these rules could 
not be implemented on classical reasoning methods, such as 
Mamdani and Takagi Sugeno, as they are demanding 
complete fuzzy rule base. The FRI methods effectively reduce 
the total number of fuzzy rules, having 245 fuzzy rules for the 
FIVE method to detect the abnormality based on five MIB 
parameters. Table III (see appendix)  presents a sample of the 
sparse fuzzy rule base that was generated by the RBE-DSS 
method.  
 
In the RBE-DSS method, the trapezoidal membership 
functions were chosen to apply during the fuzzy set 
parameters optimization. The ICMP-Out-Dest-Unreachs, IF-
Out-Discards and IF-In-Discards MIB parameters have three 
membership functions. These membership functions are 
classified into the following linguistic terms: Low, Medium 
and Large. The ip-In-Discards MIB parameter has four 
membership functions classified into the following linguistic 
terms: Very Low, Low, Medium and Large. Finally, the IP-
Out-Discards MIB parameter represents five membership 
functions which are classified into the following linguistic 
terms: Very Low, Low, Medium, Large and Very Large. The 
inference engine of the proposed detection approach was 
performed by the FIVE method. The FIVE FRI method and 
SFMI source codes can be downloaded through [32]. 
 
The RBE-DSS method optimises the values of fuzzy set 
parameters to the maximum performance of the fuzzy IDS. 
Fig.4 presents the proposed detection approach’s antecedent 
partitions. The proposed detection approach could offer the 
conclusion (detection result) even in situations where some 
MIB parameters are not explicitly defined in the generated 
fuzzy rule base. Table IV (see appendix) lists the fuzzy set 
values optimized by the RBE-DSS method. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  The Antecedents Partitions of The Proposed Detection Approach 
 
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
This section introduces the simulation and discusses the 
results of the proposed detection approach in details. The 
implemented experiments were performed using Matlab [33] 
and the Fuzzy Rule Interpolation Toolbox (FRIT) [32]. The 
FIVE method was chosen as the inference engine of the 
proposed detection approach. As detailed in section (V), the 
total number of training data consisted of 2998 instances of 
normal and abnormal traffics. The training data were used to 
construct and optimize the proposed detection approach. The 
rest of MIB dataset consisted of 1998 instances which were 
used for the validation process. It is worth mentioning that, 
every observation within the SNMP-MIB dataset was 
presented as a fuzzy singleton. The proposed detection 
approach was able to generate intelligible results due to it’s 
fuzzy nature, subsequently allowing the degree of abnormality 
to be determined.  
 
Fig.5 presents the output response of the proposed detection 
approach in the case of abnormal instance with the parameters 
which are listed in Table V. The data conclude that the degree 
of abnormality has been determined. Subsequently, the results, 

NOTE: VL = VERY LOW, L = LOW, M = MEDIUM, H = HIGH, VH= 
VERY HIGH.
which are now more concise, serve to help administrators 
better understanding the network’s current security status. 
 
TABLE V 
ABNORAML MIB PARAMETERS EXAMPLE 
MIB Parameters Value 
IF-Out-Discards 7270 
IF-In-Discards 7270 
IP-Out-Discards 1287 
IP-In-Discards 9 
ICMP-Out-Dest-Unreachs 0 
 
 
 
Fig.5  The Output Response of The Proposed Detection Approach 
 
The proposed detection approach was evaluated in a two-
phase process. The first phase evaluated the normal repository 
and the second phase was evaluated the abnormal repository. 
A total of 1998 MIB parameter instances were tested and 
evaluated. Fig.6 displays the results from both phases (normal 
and abnormal) of the detection approach’s evaluation process. 
 
 
 
Fig.6  The Confusion Matrix of The Evaluation Process 

It was concluded that five instances of normal traffics were 
inferred incorrectly and 115 instances of abnormal traffic were 
inferred incorrectly. The obtained results have been carefully 
analyzed and investigated to highlight the strengths of the 
proposed detection approach. Typically, the IDS detection 
mechanisms’ performance depends on a few performance 
metrics parameters (i.e. detection rate, true positive rate, etc.) 
[34], which help to generate some detailed results, which can 
be compared with other literature results. 
 
The performance metric formulas of [1] and [34] were used 
to assess the performance of the proposed fuzzy IDS detection 
approach. These formulas are the overall detection rate, the 
false negative rate, the false positive rate, the true positive rate 
(sensitivity), and the true negative rate (specificity). The 
overall detection rate (accuracy) indicates the accuracy rate 
for the proposed detection approach in normal and abnormal 
test environments. The false positive rate is an indicator of the 
total number of normal traffics that are recognized as 
abnormal (false alarm). The false negative rate is an indicator 
of the total number of abnormal traffics that are recognized 
incorrectly during the evaluation process (the total number of 
intrusions that successfully passed through the detection 
approach). Table VI presents the performance metrics for the 
proposed detection approach. 
TABLE VI 
THE PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
Performance 
Parameter 
Value Formula 
Sensitivity 0.9346 TPR = TP / (TP + FN) 
Specificity 0.9792 SPC = TN / (FP + TN) 
Precision 0.9970 PPV = TP / (TP + FP) 
False Positive Rate 0.0208 FPR = FP / (FP + TN) 
False Negative Rate 0.0654 FNR = FN / (FN + TP) 
Accuracy 0.9399 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N) 
 
To summarize the aforementioned results, the performance 
of the proposed detection approach achieved satisfactory 
values and, at the same time, supports the idea that 
implementing the fuzzy rule interpolation methods for the 
reasoning part together with the SNMP-MIB parameters could 
be a promising approach in the IDS application area. 
Moreover, the results obtained from the proposed detection 
approach were compared with other literature results [30] in 
which the same MIB dataset and same number of relevant 
MIB parameters (top-5) were applied in combination with 
neural network, support vector machine and Bayesian network 
algorithms. Fig.7 compares the results between the proposed 
detection approach and other algorithms (neural network, 
support vector machine and Bayesian network). 
 
 
 
Fig.7  The Detection Rate Comparsion Results 

Consequently, the implemented experiments demonstrated 
that the proposed detection approach achieved an acceptable 
accuracy rate. Moreover, it effectively reduced the false 
positive rate parameter. The conventional detection 
approaches focus on adapting the typical data mining 
algorithms, or the classical fuzzy reasoning methods, to be 
used with raw network traffics. Although FRI methods have 
been implemented in the IDS application area, these methods 
are still under investigation. Nevertheless, current research has 
yielded satisfactory results. The strength of FRI methods is 
derived from the combination of the fuzzy concept and the 
interpolation techniques. Therefore, the FRI methods could 
pose an effective solution for the boundary problem and could 
also handle the deficiencies of the knowledge-base 
representation. The proposed detection approach can be 
characterized by the following key points: 
 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach, based on the 
(FIVE) FRI method, effectively smoothes the boundaries 
between normal and abnormal parameters by eliminating 
the binary decision. 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach provides the 
approximated degree of abnormality even if the fuzzy 
rule base (knowledge representation) is not fully defined 
(sparse). 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach generates 
comprehensive results by providing the degree of 
abnormality. 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach effectively 
reduces the false positive rate and has obtained an 
acceptable detection rate value. 
• The data show that the proposed FRI IDS detection 
approach outperformed the support vector machine and 
neural network algorithms in case of the example MIB 
parameters dataset, when it is compared to other 
literature results, having same conditions, in the same 
test-bed environment and with the same number of MIB 
parameters. 
• The strength of the proposed detection approach is based 
on combining the MIB parameters with the fuzzy rule 
interpolation reasoning method. Thus, there is no need to 
deal with raw traffics which are time consuming and 
difficult to compute. Furthermore, this method eliminates 
the need for the complete fuzzy rule base. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has introduced a novel method to detect 
abnormalities by combining the Fuzzy Interpolation based on 
the Vague Environment (FIVE) FRI reasoning with the 
Management Information Base (MIB) parameters. In that 
respect, there is no need to deal with raw traffic processing, 
which is time consuming, and difficult to compute. This 
method also eliminates the need for creating a complete fuzzy 
rule base. The MIB parameters reflect the normal and 
abnormal nature of the network traffics. The proposed 
detection approach was designed and implemented using a 
sparse fuzzy model identification method. The Rule Base 
Extension using Default Set Shapes (RBE-DSS) method was 
used to generate the sparse fuzzy rule base. The proposed 
detection approach was tested and evaluated using an open 
source MIB parameters dataset. The conducted experiments 
reflect that the proposed detection approach could effectively 
detect the abnormal traffics within the selected SNMP-MIB 
parameters dataset with 93.9% accuracy. 
The results of the proposed detection approach were 
compared with literature results, where the same MIB 
variables dataset was applied in precisely the same order. The 
results confirmed the benefits of implementing the fuzzy rule 
interpolation methods for the reasoning part of the detection 
mechanism together with the MIB parameters as traffics 
sources, and also demonstrated, that the proposed FRI IDS 
detection approach outperforms the support vector machine 
and neural network based detection on SNMP-MIB 
parameters dataset.  
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 TABLE II 
THE SNMP MIB PARAMETERS 
Interface Group TCP group IP Group ICMP Group UDP Group 
IFInOctets TCPOutRsts IPInReceives ICMPInMsgs UDPInDatagrams 
IFOutOctets TCPInSegs IPInDelivers ICMPInDestUnreachs UDPOutDatagrams 
IFoutDiscards TCPOutSegs IPOutRequests ICMPOutMsgs UDPInErrors 
IFInUcastPkts TCPPassiveOpens IPOutDiscards ICMPOutDestUnreachs UDPNoPorts 
IFInNUcastPkts TCPRetransSegs IPInDiscards ICMPInEchos 
IFInDiscards TCPCurrEstab IPForwDatagrams ICMPOutEchoReps 
IFOutUcastPkts TCPEstabResets IPOutNoRoutes 
IFOutNUcastPkts TCPActiveOpens IPInAddrErrors 
 
TABLE III 
THE SPARSE FUZZY RULES BASED ON THE MIB PARAMETERS 
No. IFoutDiscards IFInDiscards IPOutDiscards IPInDiscards ICMPOutDestUnreachs Consequence 
1 Low Low Very Low Very Low Low Normal 
2 Low Low Very Low Very Low Medium Normal 
3 Low Low Very Low High High Normal 
4 Low Low Medium Medium Medium Normal 
5 Low Medium Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
6 Medium High Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
7 High Low Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
8 High High Very High Very Low Low abnormal 
9 Medium Low Very High Very Low Low Normal 
10 Medium High Very Low High Medium abnormal 
11 Medium High Medium Medium High abnormal 
12 Medium Medium Very High Very Low Low Normal 
13 High Low Medium Medium Low abnormal 
14 Medium High Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
15 Low High Very High Very Low High abnormal 
 
TABLE IV 
THE OPTIMIZED FUZZY SET PARAMETERS 
IpOutDiscards Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
[1 1 64.8 129.1] [472.55 536.85 601.15 665.45] [627.93 692.23 756.53 820.83] [758.75 823.05 887.35 951.65] [1287 1287 1287 1287] 
IpInDiscards Very Low Low Medium High 
[9 9 10.23 21.78] [19.33 21.78 24.23 26.68] [24.23 32.28 34.73 56.78] [34.73 56.78 58 58] 
icmpOutDestUnreachs Low Medium High 
[0 0 0.58 10.93] [0.58 10.93 12.08 22.43] 12.08 22.43 23 23 
ifinDiscards Low Medium High 
[0 0 8602.57 18434.06] [83567 93399 103230 113062] [178195 188027 196630 196630] 
ifoutDiscards Low Medium High 
[0 0 8602.57 18434.06] [83567 93399 103230 113062] [178195 188027.44 196630 196630] 
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